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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The paper determines the effects of different influencing variables on the media 
company’s optimal subscription and advertising prices and editorial content. The 
company maximizes profit consisting of subscription and advertising revenue, minus 
the costs of content, advertising, and circulation, by setting the subscription and 
advertising prices and the amount of editorial content. Subscription demand is a 
function of the subscription price, the media’s editorial content, and advertising, and 
advertising demand a function of the advertising price and circulation. The condition 
for the circulation spiral to be finite is derived. It is shown that an increase in a 
variable or a parameter (e.g. circulation demand) causes the respective price to 
increase only if the demand for the other product (advertising) is elastic enough, the 
price declining if the other product’s demand is less elastic. Moreover, the increase 
leads to an increase in editorial content if advertising demand is elastic, and to a 
decrease in the advertising price. An increase in advertising demand leads to an 
increase in the advertising price if subscription demand is elastic enough, and to a 
decrease in the subscription price and editorial content. An increase in the marginal 
effect of editorial content on subscriptions leads to an increase in editorial content 
without affecting the prices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A media company can be characterized as a business selling editorial material 
and advertisers’ messages to the public, thereby selling advertisers access to the 
same public. However, I am not aware of studies where the interdependence of 
the media company’s “three legs”, or of editorial content, advertising, and 
circulation is explicitly incorporated in an optimizing model of the media company. 
Providing such an analysis is the objective of this paper. 
 
In the literature, in Baye and Morgan (2000), (2001) advertisers sell and 
consumers buy a homogenous good, its price being the only attribute of the 
advertisers’ offers in a game-theoretic setting, where a “gatekeeper” sets up a 
newspaper or a website to maximize profits. They show that the gatekeeper’s 
optimal subscription fee is low enough to induce every consumer to subscribe, but 
the optimal advertising price is high enough to induce only partial participation by 
advertisers and guarantee price dispersion, and advertised prices are lower than 
unadvertised prices. This model is quite rich for a game-theoretical model, but 
some of its findings appear to be model-specific.1 
 
Chaudhri (1998) examines newspaper pricing from an efficiency point of view 
mainly with exogenous advertising demand. He finds that it is optimal to price 
subscriptions below marginal cost and that an increase in advertising demand 
leads to a decline in the optimal subscription price.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend previous work with a model that explicitly 
incorporates the interdependence of the “three legs” of a media company, or of 
content, advertising, and circulation, to determine the effects of different 
influencing variables on the media company’s optimal subscription and advertising 
prices and editorial content. The focus being on the media company, we will 
characterize the market structure by the dependence of circulation on advertising, 
editorial content, and subscription price, and by the dependence of advertising 
demand on circulation and the advertising price, thereby abstracting from strategic 
considerations. The media company maximizes profit consisting of subscription 
and advertising revenue, minus the costs of content, advertising, and circulation, 
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by setting the subscription and advertising prices and the amount of editorial 
content. Subscription demand results from subscriber utility maximization with 
respect to the media product’s content and advertising, and other goods subject to 
a budget constraint. Advertising demand results from advertiser profit 
maximization subject to the demand function of its products. Product demand 
depends on the product price and the amount of advertising the advertiser 
purchases from the media company. The effect of advertising on the demand for 
the products  is also a function of the circulation of the advertising media. 
 
In this paper, the well-known circulation spiral is formally derived from the media 
company’s optimization problem. It will be shown that the multiplier of the 
circulation spiral is an increasing function of the partial of subscription demand 
with respect to advertising , and of the partial of advertising demand with 
respect to subscriptions , and it is finite if the product of these partials is 
smaller than one. An exogenous increase in a variable or a parameter (e.g. 
circulation) causes the respective price to increase only if the demand for the other 
activity (advertising) is elastic enough, the price declining if the demand is less 
elastic. Moreover, an increase in circulation leads to an increase in profits and in 
the optimal amount of editorial content, and to a decrease in the optimal 
advertising price if advertising demand is elastic enough. Thus an increase in 
circulation leads to a decrease in the advertising price, although advertising 
demand is an increasing function of circulation.  
( AX )
)( XA
 
An exogenous increase in advertising demand leads to an increase in profits and  
the optimal advertising price, and to a decline in the optimal subscription price and 
optimal editorial content if the demand for subscriptions is elastic enough. The 
result of Chaudhri (1998) thus holds in our more general model on this condition, 
its reverse holding if subscription demand is less elastic. Increases in (declines in 
the absolute values of) the demand elasticity of subscriptions and of advertising 
have qualitatively similar effects as an increase in subscription and advertising 
demand, respectively. An increase in  leads to an increase in profits. The 
advertising price increases if subscription demand is elastic enough, the 
subscription price and editorial content declining. They increase if advertising 
XA
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demand is less elastic. An increase in  leads to an increase in profits. The 
subscription price and editorial content increase if advertising demand is elastic 
enough. The advertising price declines. Increases in the marginal costs of 
circulation and advertising have qualitative effects roughly opposite to those of  
and , respectively. An increase in the marginal effect of editorial content on 
circulation  (and a decline in the marginal cost of editorial content) leads to 
an increase in profits and in optimal editorial content without affecting either price, 
provided advertising demand is elastic enough. 
AX
XA
AX
( SX )
 
The spread between the optimal subscription price and the marginal cost of a copy 
can be positive or negative, but it increases as the marginal cost increases, 
provided advertising demand is elastic enough, and declines if the demand is less 
elastic. An increase in the marginal cost of advertising space increases the optimal 
price of advertising space by more than the marginal cost if subscription demand 
is elastic enough. If subscription demand is inelastic, the optimal advertising price 
declines, causing a positive spread to decline and a negative spread to increase. 
 
In the following, the model is developed and analyzed in Part 2. Part 3 is the 
Conclusion. 
 
2. THE MODEL AND THE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The media company publishes a product, e.g. a newspaper, which contains 
editorial content ( )S  and advertisements ( )A . The paper is purchased by 
subscribers, who derive utility from  and S A . The paper earns revenue from 
subscriptions and from advertising, the space for which it sells to advertisers. We 
will treat possible other media as exogenous to our problem, their effects being 
expressed in terms of the values of the demand elasticities as well as the cross-
partials between circulation and advertising. 
 
The Subscriber’s model is of the form: 
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(1)  ( )21,XXUU =
 
(2)  2211 XPXPY +=
 
Eq. (1) is the subscriber’s utility function in the newspaper’s services  and in 
other goods . The function is assumed to have positive first and negative 
second derivatives with respect to the . Eq. (2) is his budget equation, where 
income  is spent on the two goods, with the  their respective prices. We will 
leave out the indices referring to the individuals for simplicity. 
( 1X )
)( 2X
iX
( )Y iP
 
Maximizing utility with respect to the  subject to the budget constraint, and 
aggregating over individuals yields the demand function for what we will call the 
media’s “subscriptions” for short:  
iX
 
(3) , ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
−+++ 11
,,, PASYXX
 
where the signs below the arguments denote the assumed signs of their partials.2 
We have written the function explicitly in terms of S  and A , which are behind the 
utility of . 1X
 
The Advertiser’s model is the form: 
 
(4)  ( ) 11 APQCKQ AAA −−=π
 
(5)  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
−+
QAKK ,1
 
Eq. (4) is the expression for the advertiser’s profit , consisting of sales revenue, 
or the price of its products (  times the quantity sold 
Aπ
)K ( )Q , minus production cost 
, and the cost of advertising in the media ( )QC A ( )AP A . Eq. (5) represents the 
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demand curve of the goods sold by the advertiser, which is a subset of : the 
selling price is an increasing function of the advertising space bought from the 
media company, and a decreasing function of the quantity of goods sold. The , 
or the partial of 
2X
AK
K  with respect to A, is an increasing function of the media’s 
circulation: All else equal, an increase in circulation shifts out the demand curve of 
the advertiser’s products, as advertising reaches more potential customers.3 We 
will leave out the indices referring to the individual advertisers like above. 
 
 We assume customers’ expenditures on  and  to be so small that we can 
ignore their effects on each others’ demand. Maximizing profit with respect to  
and 
1X Q
Q
A, subject  to Eq. (5) yields, after aggregation over advertisers: 
 
(6) . ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
−+
APXAA 111 ,
 
The Media Company 
 
(7)  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+=
+++ 1111111
,, ASXCAPXP AMπ
 
The media company’s profit consists of its subscription revenue  and its 
advertising revenue , minus production and distribution costs . The costs 
are an increasing function of circulation, of news and other editorial material, and 
of the amount of advertising. We assume diminishing returns in the short run so 
that the cost function has positive first and second derivatives with respect to its 
arguments.4,5  
( 11XP )
11 AP
A ( )⋅C
 
Maximizing profit with respect to the company’s decision variables , and  
subject to Eqs. (3) and (6) yields, leaving out subscripts “1”, since we are 
examining company 1: 
APP 11 , 1S
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(8) 
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.  This yields: 
 
(9) ( )[ ]AXXA
A
CAC
D
GP ++−= 1* ηη  
 
(10) ( )[ ]AXXA
X
A CCX
D
GP 1* ++−= ηη  
 
(11) ( )[ ]AXXA
XA
S
S CACD
GX
C ++= 1* ηηη , 
 
where a capital letter subscripted by another capital letter (e.g. ) denotes the 
partial of C  with respect to 
AC
A ; ; 
  
( )XA AXG −≡ 1/1
( ) ;//;/ 1 APPAXPX AAA ≡PX ∂∂≡ ηη ( )( )[ ] XAXAXA AXGD ηηηη /11 ++−≡ . 
 
In the expressions, G  is a multiplier, resulting from the fact that circulation is a 
function of advertising, and advertising a function of circulation. Thus, for example, 
if the media company lowers its subscription price, this increases circulation. The 
increase in circulation increases advertising demand, which feeds back to 
circulation, continuing the spiral. This well-known circulation spiral provides an 
explanation for the dynamics of changing market share: why it is relatively easy to 
sustain a rising spiral, and very hard to stop a declining spiral. The effect of the 
spiral on profits is further strengthened by scale and scope economies on the 
production side. Thus on a given market, an equilibrium between newspapers of 
roughly equal size is often unstable. If the circulation of one of them increases at 
the expense of others even if by chance, the multiplier extends the effect of the 
change. If  equals or exceeds unity, the multiplier is infinite, and the process 
continues until only one newspaper is left (c.f.  Alexander 
AX XA
et al. (1993), Bucklin et 
al. (1989), Dertouzos et al. (1990). Furhoff (1967), Gustafsson (1978), and Rosse 
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et al. (1979)). Likewise, the first newspaper in a market enjoys a considerable first-
mover advantage.6 
 
There are several restrictions on the parameter values. The  must be 
smaller than unity for to be finite, as stated above. If 
XA AX
G G  is infinity, the decision 
variables go to plus or minus infinity in response to a disturbance, as can be 
inferred from the effects below.  In such a case, the interpretation is of course that 
the new equilibrium is a corner solution. 
 
Secondly, the  and  have to be nonnegative. This means that in Eqs. (9)-(11) 
the denominators and the numerators, including the expressions in the brackets, 
have to have the same signs. Examine the case of strictly positive  for 
simplicity. In Eqs. (9) and (11) the case of positive  and translates into: 
iP SC
iP
P SC
 
(12) ( ) XAXAXAX CCAXA /11/ −>+>+ ηη  , or 
 
(13) ( ) XAXAXAX CCAXA /11/ −<+<+ ηη  , 
 
and in Eq. (10) the case of a positive : AP
 
(14) ( ) AXAXAAX CCXXA /11/ −>+>+ ηη  , or 
 
(15) ( ) AXAXAAX CCXXA /11/ −<+<+ ηη . 
 
It is easy to see that the condition in Eq. (12) implies that in Eq. (15), and the 
condition in Eq. (13) that in Eq. (14). We will therefore use Eqs. (12) and (13)  as a 
reference in the following. It is also seen that 1+Aη  and 1+Xη  can be positive or 
negative, but they must always have the same sign. In the following, we will 
examine the case of the negative ( )1+iη  to keep the discussion focused. The 
interested reader can work out the cases of positive ( )1+iη , which may apply to 
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monopoly papers, if at all. Many of these papers may, however, be in a corner, 
where marginal conditions do not hold.7 
 
The effects of the parameters and variables on , , , and  are 
summarized in Table 1. An increase in the demand for subscriptions  causes 
the marginal revenue on  to increase above its original level, leading to an initial 
increase in 
*P *AP *S *π
( )X
X
X  and in *P . Now the value, in terms of X , of the marginal yield on 
A and  ( and , respectively) has increased, giving the company an 
incentive to increase and cut 
S *PX A
*PX S
S AP .  (Note that Aand shift the entire demand 
curve of 
S
X , whereas a change in P  causes a movement along it; Eq. (3)). If 
advertising demand is more than unitarily elastic (adjusted for G  in case of the 
effect on *P ), the marginal revenue on advertising is positive. Thus advertising 
revenue increases when AP  is cut, making a greater decline in AP  optimal. The 
increase in A feeds back to X  and , increasing the expansionary effect, and S *P  
and  end up on higher levels than originally. *S
 
More exactly, *P  and  increase if *S 1+Aη  is smaller than .8 
Otherwise they decline. The  declines on the same condition and increases if 
the reverse inequality holds. Thus a key variable affecting the effects of changes in 
the demand for subscriptions also on the optimal subscription price is 
XAX CCA /−
AP
( A )η+1 , i.e. 
the price elasticity of the demand for advertising space. 
 
   [Table one about here] 
  
An exogenous increase in the elasticity of subscription demand (decline in its 
absolute value) has qualitatively similar effects,  being an increasing function of Xη
X . There is now an initial decline, rather than increase, in the marginal revenue 
on X , given X , leading to a decline in X . The decline leads to an increase in 
*P . The price increase gives the company an incentive to increase  and cut S AP , 
and these effects dominate those of the initial decline in X , provided advertising 
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demand is elastic enough. Moreover, the increase often also increases , which 
strengthens the effects. 
AX
 
An increase in the demand for advertising space ( )A  leads to a response 
symmetrical to that in response to an increase in X : an increase in profits and a 
decline, proportional to Xη , in , while  changes proportionately to the 
negative of 
*P *AP
XGη+1 , increasing if 1+Xη  is smaller than . The 
declines on the same condition. Thus the direction of the change of the price of 
advertising space is a function of the demand elasticity of subscriptions, which has 
to be adequately elastic for the conventional response. The explanation is a mirror 
image of the above. Thus the result of Chaudhri (1998) holds in our more general 
model if subscription demand is more than unitarily elastic, by so much that 
AXA CCX /−
*S
1+Xη  
is smaller than , whereas the reverse holds if subscription demand is 
less elastic.  
AXA CCX /−
 
Again, an exogenous increase in the elasticity of advertising demand A has 
qualitatively similar effects, as Aη  is an increasing function of A. There is now an 
initial decline, rather than increase, in A. Moreover, the increase often also 
increases , which strengthens the effects. The XA
*P  declines if subscription 
demand is elastic enough. To sum up, the optimal price of the company’s product 
increases when its demand increases (or becomes less elastic), if the other 
product’s demand, adjusted for the multiplier, is elastic enough, and declines if the 
demand is less elastic. 
 
An increase in the marginal effect of editorial content on circulation  leads to 
an increase in the value of the marginal product of  
( SX )
S ( )PX S , to an increase in 
profits and to an increase in the optimal amount of editorial content. What is of 
some interest is that  does not affect either price: in increasing  it leads to 
further increases in profits and sales but not the optimal prices. As the reader can 
see from Eq. (8), the model is recursive, with the top two rows forming the 
independent block: the prices and sales are determined jointly, on the basis of 
SX
*S
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which  is determined at a level at which the value of its marginal product equals 
. 
*S
SC
 
An increase in the parameters of the multiplier (  and ) increases the 
multiplier and profits. An increase in the marginal ”yield” of 
AX XA
A in terms of the 
demand for X ( AX ),  shifts out the demand curve for X , given A, increasing 
*P proportionately to Xη− , all these responses provided XAXA CCA /1 −<+η . The 
price rise increases the value of the marginal product of A  (or ). It is 
optimal to utilize the increase in  by cutting 
*PX A
AX
*AP proportionately to 1+Xη . The 
increase in *P  also increases the value of the marginal product of (or ), 
increasing . However, if 
S *PX S
*S XAXA CCA /1 −>+η  , all the responses are reversed.  
 
Likewise, an increase in  increases  proportionately to XA
*AP Aη− , (all these 
responses provided <+1Xη AXA CCX /− ), while it changes  and  
proportionately to 
*P *S
( )1+Aη , thereby lowering them. It is optimal to try to increase 
circulation  by means of cutting ( )X P , since the value of its marginal product 
 has increased. As a result of the decline in ( *AX PA ) *P , the value of the marginal 
product of editorial content (  declines, leading to a decline in . A key 
reason for the difference between the effects of  and  reflects the 
phenomenon discussed in connection with the demand elasticities. Moreover, an 
increase in  increases the marginal returns on  directly, which is true of an 
increase in  only via . Again, if 
)*PX S *S
AX XA
AX S
XA X >+1Xη AXA CCX /− , the responses are 
reversed. 
 
Increases in the marginal costs , , and  lead to a decline in profits, 
because the profitability of the respective activities has declined. An increase in 
 has effects qualitatively opposite to those of : it changes the own price 
XC AC SC
XC XA
*P , 
and , proportionately to the negative of *S 1+Aη , thereby increasing  them, 
(provided 1+Aη  is smaller than ( )XAX XA η+1/ ). The increase in the net marginal 
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value of , or  makes it optimal to cut  ( proportionately to dX ( XA CPX − ) AP Aη ), 
and the increase in  leads to an increase in  (for proof, se Eqs. (16) 
and (17) below).  An increase in  has effects qualitatively opposite to those of 
 : provided 
( XS CPX − ) *S
AC
AX 1+Aη  is smaller than ( )XAX XA η+1/ , it causes the own price *AP  
to increase proportionately to the negative of 1+Xη . The increase in ( )AAX CPA −  
makes it optimal to cut  proportionately to P Xη . The  also declines. The 
responses are reversed if the reverse inequality holds. Again, an increase in  
has effects qualitatively opposite to those of : it leads to a decline in profits and 
 without affecting  or :  is a fixed cost with respect to  and 
*S
SC
SX
*S *P *AP SC X A . 
These effects reflect the structure discussed above. 
 
The optimal subscription price is not necessarily below the marginal cost of 
production . We obtain the expression for the difference between the 
subscription price and its marginal cost 
XC
X∆  from Eq. (9): 
 
(16) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−=∆ X
X
A
AX
A
X CG
GCA
D
G
η
η
η
1  . 
 
The multiplier of Eq. (16) is negative, observing its sign if ( )1/1 +<+ XAXA XA ηη . 
The first term in the expression in the brackets is positive and the second 
negative, observing its sign. The expression is negative if either 
( 1/1 )+<+ XAXA XA ηη  and the expression in the brackets is positive, or if both 
conditions are reversed. Otherwise the expression is positive. The result of 
Chaudhri (1998) thus holds only under the above conditions in our more general 
model. Moreover, it is easy to see from the expression that : a 
negative spread narrows and a positive spread widens as  increases, the price 
increasing by more if 
0/ >∆ XX dCd
XC
( )1/1 +<+ XAXA XA ηη . 
 
The difference between the advertising price and its marginal cost  increases 
when the marginal cost increases. We have: 
A∆
 12
 
(17) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−=∆ A
A
X
XA
X
A CG
GCX
D
G
η
η
η
1  . 
 
The multiplier of Eq. (17) is negative, observing its sign if ( )1/1 +<+ XAXA XA ηη . 
The first term in the brackets is positive, and the second negative, observing its 
sign. Thus the spread between the advertising price and its marginal cost can be 
positive or negative. The  is positive on the above condition and negative 
if the reverse inequality holds. In the former case, an increase in  causes 
AA dCd /∆
AC
*AP  to 
increase so that a positive spread widens and a negative spread narrows. If the 
reverse inequality holds, the responses are reversed. These results are a 
consequence of the fact that X , A and  are jointly determined: When e.g.  
increases, 
S XC
*P  increases if ( )1/1 +<+ XAXA XA ηη , which increases  
and , leading to a decline in 
( )XA CPX −
( XS CPX − ) *AP  and an increase in , which feeds 
back to the market for . As we explained the responses when discussing the 
effects of the different parameters and variables on the optimal decision variables, 
we will not repeat them at greater length here. 
*S
X
  
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
We have developed an optimizing model of the media company, explicitly 
incorporating the interdependence of editorial content, advertising, and circulation, 
to determine the effects of different influencing variables on the media company’s 
optimal subscription and advertising prices and editorial content. 
 
It was shown that the circulation spiral leads to a finite change only if the product 
of the partial of circulation with respect to advertising ( )AX  and the partial of 
advertising with respect to circulation ( )XA  is smaller than one. An increase in a 
variable or a parameter (e.g. circulation) causes the respective price  to increase 
only if the demand for the other product (advertising) is elastic enough, the price 
declining if the demand is less elastic. Thus an increase in A ( X ) leads to an 
increase in the advertising (subscription) price and to a decrease in the 
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subscription (advertising) price if the demand for subscriptions (advertising) is 
elastic enough. It leads to a decrease (increase) in editorial content on the above 
condition on elasticity. Thus an increase in circulation leads to a decline in the 
advertising price on this condition, although advertising is an increasing function of 
circulation. Increases in the demand elasticities of subscriptions and advertising 
have qualitatively similar effects as increases in X  and A, respectively. 
 
An increase in  leads to an increase in profits and the advertising price if 
subscription demand is elastic enough. It leads to a decline in the subscription 
price and editorial content. It leads to an increase if advertising demand is less 
elastic. An increase in  leads to an increase in profits, the subscription price, 
and editorial content if advertising demand is elastic enough. The advertising price 
declines. It increases if subscription demand is less elastic. Increases in the 
marginal costs of circulation and advertising have qualitative effects roughly 
opposite to those of  and , respectively. An increase in the marginal effect 
of editorial content on circulation (a decline in the marginal cost of editorial 
content) leads to an increase in profits and the optimal amount of editorial content 
without affecting either price, provided advertising demand is more than unitarily 
elastic. 
XA
AX
XA AX
 
An increase in the marginal cost of advertising space increases the optimal price 
of advertising by more than the change in the marginal cost, provided subscription 
demand is elastic enough, causing a positive spread to widen and a negative 
spread to narrow. If subscription demand is less elastic, the optimal advertising 
price increases by less or declines, causing a positive spread to decline and a 
negative spread to increase. 
 
A symmetrical condition holds for an increase in the marginal cost of circulation.  
 
Three conditions turned out to be critical for the direction of the responses of the 
optimal prices and editorial content: The values of the elasticities of circulation and 
advertising demand relative to weighted ratios of the respective marginal costs, 
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and relative to the multiplier, given that we focused the discussion on demand 
elasticities in excess of unity. 
 
The present approach can be extended to the media company’s long-run strategy 
choices, where , , , and C  are variables. The company then tries to 
achieve a good match between subscribers and advertisers. By choosing its 
editorial content, it defines subscriber group. That defines a potential advertiser 
group. Advertising increases the value of the media to subscribers at least within a 
range, increasing circulation, which continues the spiral. There is a large number 
of strategies that the company can choose from, given the other players on the 
market. (See e.g. Gabszewitz 
XA AX SX
et al. (2002), and Häckner et al. (2002). 
 
Interdependence of products is classic for newspapers, but it has applications for a 
number of businesses: Soccer, hockey, and football clubs have only recently 
woken up to the unexploited opportunities offered by advertising and 
sponsorships, and those that have not find themselves in difficulties, with declining  
gate and  television revenues, while player costs (the counterpart of ) are bid up 
by the clubs that have. Economies of scale in the production of the clubs in terms 
of the sizes of stadiums and opportunities for television coverage have also 
caused player costs to be bid up, which has increased the critical population of a 
city making a good team viable, let alone two. On the other hand, a niche strategy 
makes it possible for a small community to have a successful team on a lower 
level or in a smaller sport -- or if the club manages to focus enough potential fans 
on its sport at the expense of other sports or attractions. Therefore the present 
approach finds applications in a number of industries, on each of which there are 
numerous parameter estimates, optimum prices, and strategies waiting to be 
discovered. 
SC
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NOTES 
 
1. Of studies of the media company and market structure, Gabszewitz et al. (2002) 
examine the editorial line of the newspapers in a sequential game framework of a 
duopoly, and show that the papers have a tendency to approach the line of the 
median subscriber analogously with Hotelling’s well-known theory of spatial 
competition. 
 
Häckner et al. (2000) study the interplay of circulation, advertising, and market 
structure in a duopoly framework. 
 
Masson et al. (1990) examine the relationship between concentration and 
advertising in a framework where consumer utility is a declining function of 
advertising and the media is a public good -- a situation that sometimes holds for 
commercial broadcasting. 
 
2. While subscription being an increasing function of advertising appears to be a 
reasonable assumption for newspapers at least within a range, this does not 
necessarily have to hold for broadcasting: it is easy to turn the page of a 
newspaper if an advertisement is not of interest, whereas a commercial break with 
an uninteresting message constitutes a disruption in a radio or television program 
and can at worst generate negative marginal utility for the viewer. See Masson et 
al. (1990), and Becker et al. (1993). While extending the analysis to cover the case 
of a negative  is straightforward, it is beyond the scope of this paper.  AX
 
3. For instance, if the advertiser is willing to pay a certain price per column inch of 
advertising space for each contact, it should be willing to pay twice as much per 
inch if the circulation doubles. 
 
4. In the long run the cost function has been found to have the following 
properties. Considerable economies of scale have been found at least with respect 
to circulation because the cost of content and advertising (first copy cost) is 
roughly fixed with respect to , only printing and distribution costs being a 1X
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function of  (see Picard (1993) and Rosse 1X et al. (1979)). Thus most 
newspapers operate on the declining portion of their envelope curve at least if one 
abstracts from distribution costs. Therefore ( ) ( )111'1111 ,,,, ASXCXASXC > , where 
 denotes marginal cost, and a bar that the variable is fixed. Rosse (1967) finds 
that the average cost per subscriber inch declines by 3 per cent for each 10 per 
cent increase in subscriber inch output. There also appears to be economies of 
scope between and  so that 
'C
1S 1A ( ) ( ) ( )1111 , ACSCASC +< . 
 
5. 7-10 % of a newspaper’s operating expenses is attributable to editorial or non-
advertising content, and 5-6 % to advertising.  25-45 % is attributable to printing, of 
which a half is on newsprint alone. Distribution accounts for 10 % of operating 
expenses. (See Busterna (1988a) and Picard (1993).) 
 
Picard states: “Readers more than bear the cost of producing the editorial portions 
of newspapers. Only 16 % of the cost of producing a paper is attributable to 
editorial or nonadvertising content, and circulation revenue accounts for 20-35 % 
of newspapers’ revenue”. It may be tempting to read too much into this statement, 
because in a newspaper, the subscriber purchases both nonadvertising and 
advertising content, and the cost of a subscription is payment for both. The 
statement holds even more for advertisers, advertising accounting for some 65 % 
of revenue. 
 
6. Of course, the multiplier process takes place over time. The current formulation 
can easily be extended to nest discounting for e.g. investment decisions. We then 
have: ( AX XAG )β−≡ 1/1 , where ( ) 11 −+≡ rβ , and r  the discount rate. (In 
addition, , , and  get discounted to account for within-round lags, but 
this is a minor effect.) 
AX SX XA
 
7. The demand for advertising space by retail advertisers has been found to be 
inelastic with respect to price except in larger markets where there are competing 
media (see Busterna (1987)). 90 % of U.S. newspapers are monopolies in their 
markets, (see Busterna (1988b), and their circulation demand has been found to 
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be inelastic with respect to price (see Grotta (1977)). It is important to note, 
however, that these estimates have been from models ignoring the 
interdependence of circulation, advertising, and content, and are therefore likely to 
be biased downward compared to the effects that we have been emphasizing. 
 
8. If ( 1+A )η  is positive,  and  increase, as well, provided also *S *P ( )AGη+1  is 
positive. 
 21
 
 
 Table 1. The Effects of the Parameters on the Optimal Prices and  S
 
 
          SX AX XA SC AC XC AA ,η   XX ,η  
 
*P   0  +1    -2         0  -3   +3    -2      +1 
 
*AP   0  -1         +2    0  +3   -3    +2      -1 
 
*S   + +1   -2           -  -3   +3    -2          +1 
 
X∆          +3 
 
A∆       +3 
 
π   +  +    +     -  -   -   +      + 
 
 
 
 
1 XAXA CCAif /1 −<+η , otherwise reverse inequality holds 
 2 AXAX CCXif /1 −<+η ,  otherwise reverse inequality holds 
 3  ( XAXA XAif )ηη +<+ 1/1 , reverse sign if reverse inequality holds 
